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Abstract
Quantum theory’s irreducible empirical core is a probability calculus.
While it presupposes the events to which (and on the basis of which)
it serves to assign probabilities, and therefore cannot account for their
occurrence, it has to be consistent with it. It must make it possible to
identify a system of observables that have measurement-independent
values. What makes this possible is the incompleteness of the spa-
tiotemporal differentiation of the physical world. This is shown by ap-
plying a novel interpretive principle to interfering alternatives involving
distinctions between regions of space. Applying the same interpretive
principle to alternatives involving distinctions between things makes
it safe to claim that the macroworld comes into being through a pro-
gressive differentiation of a single, intrinsically undifferentiated entity.
By entering into reflexive spatial relations, this entity gives rise to (i)
what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the re-
lations is not taken into account, and (ii) what looks like a substantial
expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. The necessary
distinction between two domains (classical and quantum, or macro and
micro) and their mutual dependence is best understood as a distinction
between the manifested world and its manifestation.
1 Introduction
There is no denying that quantum mechanics has a measurement problem.
One would like to know why the theory’s mathematical core is a probability
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calculus, and why the events it serves to correlate are measurement out-
comes. But this is not what the usual interpretive fuss is about. What is
commonly discussed as the measurement problem is the problem of objecti-
fication. The literature on this problem, which still follows largely its first
rigorous formulations in the monographs of von Neumann [1] and Pauli [2],
postulates a measurement scheme comprised of three stages: the system
preparation, a continuous dynamical process called “premeasurement” (p),
and the seemingly miraculous appearance of an outcome called “objectifica-
tion” (o):
∑
k
ck|A0〉|qk〉
(p)
−→
∑
k
ck|Ak〉|qk〉
(o)
−→ |A(q)〉|q〉. (1)
That there is something seriously wrong with this scheme can be deduced
from the existence of proofs to the effect that the objectification problem is
insoluble [3, 4].
The usual interpretation of (1) is that initially the apparatus (really,
objectively) is in the neutral state, and that eventually the apparatus (really,
objectively) indicates that the measured observable has the value q. To be
sure, initially the apparatus is indeed in the neutral state, and eventually it
indeed indicates a particular value, but this is not what these expressions
mean.
What these expressions mean is that the initial state assigns probability
1 to the outcome of a measurement which indicates that the apparatus is
in the neutral state, and the final state assigns probability 1 to the out-
come of a measurement which indicates that the apparatus indicates the
outcome q. The quantum formalism itself does not warrant the assumption
that probability 1 is sufficient for “is” or “has.”
To make the prepared quantum state represent the fact that the appa-
ratus is in the neutral state, and to make the final quantum state represent
the fact that the apparatus indicates a particular outcome, one has to adopt
the so-called “eigenvalue-eigenstate link” as an interpretive principle. Here
is how this principle was formulated by Dirac [5]:
The expression that an observable “has a particular value” for
a particular state is permissible. . . in the special case when a
measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular
value, so that the state is an eigenstate of the observable.
If we do not adopt the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, then we must distinguish
between the collapse transition from
∑
k ck|Ak〉|qk〉 to |A(q)〉|q〉 and the ob-
jectification transition from probability 1 to “is” or “has.” In other words,
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even if we had an explanation for the collapse, it would not account for the
fact that measurements tend to have outcomes. Nor could it, for there can
be no dynamical explanation for an interpretive principle like the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link.
2 The real measurement problem
Quantum mechanics presupposes the events to which (and on the basis of
which) it assigns probabilities, and so it has to be consistent with their
occurrence. But we cannot simply postulate that outcome-indicating devices
are exempt from the quantum-mechanical correlation laws. We have to show
that it is legitimate to look upon the values of certain observables as existing
independently of measurements.
Although a distinction has to be made between formulations and inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics, the choice of a formulation cannot but
bias the available interpretations. Among the better known formulations
are Heisenberg’s matrix formulation, Schro¨dinger’s wave-function formula-
tion, Feynman’s path-integral formulation, the density-matrix formulation,
and Wigner’s phase-space formulation. I find it strange that a junior-level
classical mechanics course devotes a considerable amount of time to dif-
ferent formulations of classical mechanics—such as Newtonian, Lagrangian,
Hamiltonian, least action—whereas even graduate-level courses emphasize
the wave-function formulation almost to the exclusion of all variants. Since
this is the formulation that tempts us most to think of a quantum state
as an evolving state that exists at every instant of time, and that implies,
via the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, the actual existence of those properties or
values to which probability 1 is assigned, we have every reason to distrust
it.
To show that it is legitimate to look upon the values of certain observ-
ables as existing independently of measurements, I shall use Feynman’s for-
mulation, and I shall invoke an interpretive principle that seems natural in
the context of this formulation, rather than interpretive principles like the
eigenvalue-eigenstate link, which seem natural in the context of the wave
function formulation.
Here goes. There are two core rules. The general task is to calculate the
probability of a possible outcome of a final measurement, given the actual
outcome of an initial measurement, and the way to proceed is to imagine a
sequence of measurements that may be made in the meantime. If the inter-
mediate measurements are actually made (or if it is possible to infer from
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other measurements what their outcomes would have been if they had been
made), we use Rule A, which requires us to first square the absolute values of
the amplitudes and then add the results. If the intermediate measurements
are not made (and if it is not possible to infer from other measurements
what their outcomes would have been), we use Rule B, which requires us to
first add the amplitudes and then square the absolute value of the result.
From the wave-function point of view, Rule B seems uncontroversial.
Superpositions are “normal,” and what is normal requires no explanation.
What calls for explanation is the existence of mixtures that admit of an
ignorance interpretation. From Feynman’s point of view, the uncontroversial
rule is A, inasmuch as this is what classical probability theory leads us to
expect. What calls for explanation is why we have to add amplitudes, rather
than probabilities, whenever the conditions stipulated by Rule B are met.
So why do we have to add amplitudes when we are required to do so?
Here is why:
Whenever quantum mechanics instructs us to use Rule B, the distinctions we
make between the alternatives correspond to nothing in the physical world.
They lack objective reality.
This is a statement about the structure or constitution of the physical world,
not a statement merely of our practical or conceptual limitations.
3 First application (regions of space)
Applied to a two-slit experiment with electrons (or any two-way interferom-
eter for that matter), this interpretive principle implies that the distinction
we make between “the electron went through the left slit” and “the electron
went through the right slit” corresponds to nothing in the physical world.
Since this distinction rests on a distinction between regions of space, it fol-
lows that space cannot be an intrinsically differentiated expanse. It has no
“inbuilt” parts. But then what permits us to distinguish between “here”
and “there”? What furnishes space with its so-called parts?
What furnishes space with its so-called parts is its “material content.”
A “region of space” can become the property of a particle (or atom, or
molecule) only if it is realized by being monitored by a detector. (A de-
tector is anything that can indicate the presence of something somewhere.)
The apparatus is needed not only to indicate the possession of a property
or a value, but also—and in the first place—to realize a set of properties or
values so as to make them available for attribution. This is why the kine-
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matical properties of microphysical objects only exist when their existence
is indicated by macroscopic objects. To be is to be measured.
Now we are just a skip and a hop away from identifying the observables
whose values can legitimately be regarded as existing independently of mea-
surements. Because an apparatus is needed to realize a region of space, any
attempt to partition space into progressively smaller regions will come to
a halt when the detectors needed for the purpose cease to exist. We can
therefore conceive of a partition of the physical world into finite regions so
small that none of them can be attributed (as a position) because none of
them is realized (by a detector). In short, the spatial differentiation of the
physical world is incomplete. It does not go “all the way down.”
The same goes for the world’s temporal differentiation, not only because
of the relativistic interdependence of distances and durations but also be-
cause the indefiniteness principle for energy and time makes it impossible
to realize sharp times. What is incomplete, therefore, is not quantum me-
chanics (as was argued by EPR) but the spatiotemporal differentiation of
the objective world.
In an incompletely differentiated world, there will be objects whose po-
sition distributions are and remain so narrow that there are no detectors
with narrower position distributions. If anything truly deserves the label
“macroscopic,” it is these objects.
While arguments based on environmental decoherence cannot solve the
objectification problem, or can solve it only for all practical purposes, they
do support the conclusion that the indefiniteness of a macroscopic position
is never revealed in the only way it could be revealed—through a departure
from what the classical laws predict. Macroscopic objects follow trajectories
that are only counterfactually indefinite. Their positions are “smeared out”
only relative to an imaginary spatiotemporal background that is more dif-
ferentiated than the objective world. The testable correlations between the
outcomes of measurements of macroscopic positions are therefore consistent
with both the classical and the quantum laws.
And so the observables we were looking for are the positions of macro-
scopic objects. We all knew this, of course. My point here was to show that
it is consistent to do two things that are generally regarded as incompatible:
to apply quantum mechanics to the positions of macroscopic objects, and
to attribute to these positions a measurement-independent reality. What
makes this possible is the incompleteness of the spatiotemporal differentia-
tion of the physical world. (What renders the objectification problem insol-
uble is the complete temporal differentiation of the physical world implied
by the tripartite measurement scheme inaugurated by von Neumann [1] and
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Figure 1: Whenever quantum mechanics instructs us to add the amplitudes
of the two alternatives rather than their probabilities, the straight lines,
which represent transtemporal individuators of some kind, do not correspond
to anything in the physical world.
Pauli [2].)
There are theorems in quantum field theory that extend the insolubility
proofs for the objectification problem into the relativistic domain. Among
them is a theorem by Clifton and Halvorson [6], to the effect that a particle
cannot be “in a state” in which the probability of finding it in some finite
region of space is 1. From this, Clifton and Halvorson have drawn the
conclusion that the experience of detecting particles in finite regions of space
is “illusory” and “strictly fictional.”
What Clifton and Halvorson failed to take into account is that the space-
time manifold postulated by quantum field theory is not where experiments
are performed. What is illusory is the notion that attributable positions
are defined by spatial regions of this manifold. Attributable positions are
defined by the sensitive regions of detectors, which, according to the afore-
said theorem, also cannot be localized in any finite region of space. What
is strictly fictional is the spacetime manifold postulated by quantum field
theory. What Clifton and Halvorson have shown is not that there are no
localizable particles but that this manifold is not localizable relative to the
positions that particles can possess.
4 Second application (things)
The setup now consists of four non-overlapping regions A, B, C, D, realized
by the sensitive regions of four detectors (Figure 1). Initial measurements
indicate the presence of one particle in A and one particle in B. We wish
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to calculate the probability with which subsequently one particle is found in
C and one in D. According to the interpretive principle introduced above,
whenever quantum mechanics instructs us to add the corresponding ampli-
tudes, the distinction we make between these two alternatives corresponds
to nothing in the physical world. Since this distinction rests on a distinction
between individual things, it follows that the particle found in A is neither
a different individual from the particle found in D nor a different individual
from the particle found in C, and the same goes for the particle found in B.
One may therefore be excused for concluding that the particles in C and D
(and hence the particles in A and B as well) are one and the same entity!
I am not the first to have this preposterous idea. In his Nobel Lecture
on December 11, 1965, Feynman recalled:
I received a telephone call one day at the graduate college at
Princeton from Professor Wheeler, in which he said, “Feynman,
I know why all electrons have the same charge and the same
mass.” “Why?” “Because, they are all the same electron!”
What’s more, there is no compelling reason to believe that this identity
ceases to be real when it ceases to have observable consequences, owing to
the presence of “identity tags.” Nothing therefore stands in the way of the
claim that, intrinsically, each particle is numerically identical with every
other particle. What presents itself here and now with these properties and
what presents itself there and then with those properties is the same entity.
What is certain, at any rate, is that the view according to which the
world can be understood as a system of interacting constituents, has passed
its expiration date. We cannot make sense of the behaviour of identical
particles if we conceive of them as numerically distinct constituents. And if
probability 1 is not sufficient for “is” or “has,” then the kinematical prop-
erties of microphysical objects only exist when they are indicated by—or
can be inferred from—the behaviour of macroscopic objects, in which case
the properties of macroscopic objects cannot be explained in terms of the
properties of microscopic objects and their interactions.
How are we to understand this mysterious interdependence of the two
domains—macroscopic and microscopic, classical and quantum? Here is how
it was stated by Landau and Lifshitz and by Michael Redhead:
quantum mechanics. . . contains classical mechanics as a limiting
case, yet at the same time it requires this limiting case for its
own formulation. [7]
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In a sense the reduction instead of descending linearly towards
the elementary particles, moves in a circle, linking the reductive
basis back to the higher levels. [8]
What Redhead appears to have missed, along with everyone else I should
say, is that in addition to linking the properties of the quantum domain
back to the properties of the classical domain, the alleged reduction does
something else.
Here is what. Our attempts to conceptually divide the world reach a
point where the distinctions we make between things, as well as the distinc-
tions we make between regions of space, cease to exist. Instead of arriving at
a “reductive basis,” we arrive at an intrinsically undivided spatial expanse
and at an Entity that is numerically identical with every one of the world’s
so-called ultimate constituents. In other words, the real number of ultimate
constituents is one. And since this single ultimate constituent is the only
thing that exists independently of anything else, we would be justified in
calling it Pure Being, or something to that effect.
5 Manifestation
The reason why it is so hard to beat sense into quantum mechanics is that
the theory answers a question that we are not in the habit of asking. The
question we should be asking is this: How are forms—the shapes of things—
manifested? This question has a simple answer: forms (including the all-
encompassing form called “space”) are manifested by means of reflexive
spatial relations. By entering into reflexive spatial relations, Pure Being
gives rise to (i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality
of the relations is ignored, and (ii) what looks like a substantial expanse
if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. As Leibniz said, omnibus
ex nihilo ducendis sufficit unum—one is enough to create everything from
nothing. A single self-existent entity is enough to create the relata we call
particles as well as the expanse we call space.
The distinction between the two domains is essentially the distinction
between the manifested world and its manifestation. While the manifested
world is a world of interacting objects and causally connected events, the
manifestation of such a world cannot be understood in terms of what is mani-
fested. Instead of describing it in the language of interacting objects and
causally connected events, quantum mechanics describes it in the language
of correlations between the possible outcomes of hypothetically performed
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measurements. This is how the alleged reduction “moves in a circle, linking
the reductive basis back to the higher levels.”
The manifestation of the macroworld is a transition from a condition of
complete indefiniteness and indistinguishability to a condition of complete
definiteness and distinguishability, and what is not definite or distinguish-
able can only be described in terms of correlations between events that are
definite and distinguishable. What is instrumental in the manifestation can
only be described in terms of what is manifested.
If what we have is a Pure Being capable of entering into reflexive spa-
tial relations, and if what we want is a world of deterministically evolving
objects, then we need spatially extended objects that are reasonably stable.
How does one create such objects using nothing but spatial relations between
relata that lack spatial extent? The answer to this question is: quantum
mechanics.
In a previous paper [9] I derived quantum mechanics from the existence
of reasonably stable, spatially extended objects that are (or appear to be)
composites of objects that lack spatial extent. What is crucial for the exis-
tence of such objects is the indefiniteness of their internal relative positions
and momenta. This raises the question of what is the right or best way of
dealing with an indefinite physical quantity. And the answer to this question
is: assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of a measurement of this
quantity. This is one reason why the mathematical formalism of quantum
physics is a probability calculus, and why the events to which it serves to
assign probabilities are measurement outcomes.
It may even be that quantum mechanics, in turn, requires the validity of
both the standard model and general relativity. For (i) quantum mechanics
presupposes the macroscopic events which it correlates, (ii) the existence of
macroscopic events requires a sufficient variety of chemical elements, and
(iii) the existence of a sufficient variety of chemical elements requires the
validity of the standard model and general relativity, at least as effective
theories. In another paper [10] I put forward arguments in support of these
claims. (See also Chap. 22 of Mohrhoff [11].)
6 Summary
What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about the physical world is
that there is an Ultimate Reality—undifferentiated and therefore beyond
categorization—which manifests the world by entering into reflexive spa-
tial relations. The relations constitute space, and the resulting apparent
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multitude of relata is what, for want of a better word, we call particles.
If a “classical” world emerges, it is not from some mystical domain of
potentiality, nor by a dynamical process, nor through environmental deco-
herence, but by a progressive manifestation. The first stage of this atemporal
process, which is probed by high-energy physics, can only be described in
terms of correlations between the “clicks” of non-existent detectors. At ener-
gies low enough for atoms to be stable, it becomes possible to think in terms
of objects with fixed numbers of components. These we describe in terms of
correlations between the possible outcomes of unperformed measurements.
Molecules bring us another step closer to the manifested world, inasmuch
as they are the first objects with forms that can be visualized—their atomic
configurations. But it is only the finished product—the macroworld—that
gives us the actual detector “clicks” and the actual measurement outcomes
that allow us to test the correlations in terms of which quantum mechanics
describes the manifestation of the world—that is, the transition from Pure
Being to the manifested world.
Physical theory proceeds from what is obvious. What is obvious to any-
one who can tell the difference between mathematics and the physical world
is that physics concerns correlations between measurement outcomes. What
is also obvious by now is the atomic constitution of matter, the stability of
matter under conditions favourable to the existence of physicists, and the
dependence of the stability of matter on the stability of atoms. From these
data one can derive quantum mechanics [9] and, arguably, the standard
model and general relativity, at least as effective theories [10]. The bottom
line: Fundamentalism in physics is a red herring. While we are (or may be)
able to deduce QM+SM+GR from what is obvious, we are not in a position
to deduce what is obvious from any physical theory.
Before concluding I need to address “some technical quibbles” raised by
a reviewer. Noting that I seem to assume that detectors are necessarily
macroscopic, the reviewer requests that this be stated as an assumption,
and further asks whether the incompleteness of the spatial differentiation
of the physical world implies the existence of a “fundamental length.” The
question whether detectors are necessarily macroscopic obviously depends
on the respective definitions of “detector” and “macroscopic.” A detector,
the reader will recall, is anything that can indicate the presence of some-
thing somewhere, and a macroscopic object is an object Mwhose position
distribution (determined by all outcome-indicating events that contribute to
define it) is and remains so narrow that there are no detectors with narrower
position distributions—detectors that could distinguish between regions over
which M ’s position is distributed.
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The context in which this question arises is the challenge to demonstrate
what von Weizsa¨cker has called “semantic consistency”: “Semantic consis-
tency of a theory will mean that its preconceptions, how we interpret the
mathematical structure physically, will themselves obey the laws of the the-
ory” [12]. To demonstrate the semantic consistency of quantum mechanics
means to establish the consistency of the theory’s formal apparatus (qua
probability calculus) with the outcome-indicating events whose existence it
presupposes and which it serves to correlate—in short, to establish the con-
sistency of the correlations with their correlata. That this is problematic
is shown by the insolubility proofs for the objectification problem and their
extensions into the relativistic domain.
What makes this problematic is the all but universally accepted view
that the points and instants on which a wave function depends correspond
one-to-one to the elements of an intrinsically and completely differentiated
spacetime. Establishing the semantic consistency of quantum mechanics is
made possible by the interpretive principle introduced in Sect. 2, inasmuch
as this implies, via the incompleteness of the spatiotemporal differentiation
of the physical world, the existence of macroscopic objects, which follow tra-
jectories that are only counterfactually indefinite, so that the testable cor-
relations between the outcomes of measurements of macroscopic positions
are consistent with both the classical and the quantum laws. Because these
(and only these) correlations are consistent with the classical laws, we can
attribute to those (and only those) positions a measurement-independent
reality, and this not merely for all practical purposes. Non-macroscopic po-
sitions only exist (or have values) if and when (and to the extent that) they
are measured. Only a macroscopic position, therefore, is capable of indicat-
ing a measurement outcome. And since a detector is something that can in-
dicate the presence of something somewhere, it must possess a macroscopic
part—the proverbial pointer needle—whose position can serve to indicate
the detection of an object in the detector’s sensitive region. That detectors
are necessarily macroscopic (in this sense) is therefore not an independent
assumption but a necessary consequence of the interpretive principle intro-
duced in Sect. 2.
As to the question whether the incompleteness of the spatial differenti-
ation of the physical world implies the existence of a fundamental length, I
don’t see how this might be the case.
It goes without saying that the novel interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics presented here raises further questions and/or objections. Some of these
are answered in another paper [13]—owing to its length somewhat to the
detriment of the overall picture, which the present more succinct paper aims
11
to highlight.
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